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Separating Amicus Wheat from Chaff 
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL* & ADAM FELDMAN**  
INTRODUCTION 
The number of amicus briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court 
has been growing for decades, and that number is now huge. The seventy-
five or so cases on the Supreme Court’s argument calendar each year 
generate some nine hundred amicus briefs in total.1 Cases with thirty or 
more amicus briefs are no longer particularly rare, and the highest-profile 
cases see amicus filings reaching the triple digits.2  
Although amicus briefs can provide valuable information, the large and 
growing volume of amicus filings threatens the Court and commentators 
with a form of information overload. Knowledgeable sources tell us what 
logic suggests, namely that some truly valuable information can get lost in 
the amicus avalanche.3 Experts also report that too many amicus briefs are 
of the “me too” variety—that is, briefs that largely repeat the arguments 
made by the parties or other amici rather than adding new information.4 As 
the Supreme Court’s rules explain, the Court benefits from amicus briefs 
that “bring[] to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought 
to its attention by the parties,” but “[a]n amicus curiae brief that does not 
serve this purpose”—as many briefs today probably do not—“burdens the 
Court.”5 There is, in short, a growing threat of amicus overload, especially 
in the most salient cases, and the problem will only become more acute if 
current filing trends continue. 
If the Supreme Court faces an overabundance of amicus briefs, 
especially duplicative ones, is there a solution? We do not claim to have a 
complete solution, but—like a good amicus brief—we can make a novel 
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1. See Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on 
Amicus Curiae in the 2012–13 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/4QLR-
U958; Jacqueline Bell & Christina Violante, BigLaw’s Amicus Business Is Booming, But 
Is the Court Listening?, LAW360 (Oct. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/KNP9-U88Y. 
2. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, In Unusual Term, Big Year for Amicus 
Curiae at the Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/5L98-UWNK.   
3. See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 101 VA. L. REV. 1901, 
1924 (2016). 
4. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus 
Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 44–45 (2004) (describing clerks’ efforts to find the 
relatively few briefs that made novel contributions).  
5. SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (emphasis added). 
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and useful contribution to the problem’s management. Someone facing a 
huge pile of amicus briefs with limited time needs a way to engage in triage. 
We propose the use of plagiarism-detection software as a tool to help 
identify the amicus briefs with the most useful and novel content. Such a 
prioritization tool should prove valuable to the Court (especially to the law 
clerks, who are mostly responsible for wading through amicus briefs), as 
well as to other audiences like the press, the academy, and anyone else who 
wants to make his or her limited reading time more productive. 
The remainder of this essay describes several potential solutions to the 
amicus overload problem, explains our method and its relative virtues 
(along with its limitations), provides some illustrative results from using the 
method on high-profile cases from recent terms, and points toward further 
applications and refinements.  
I.  WEAKNESSES OF GATEKEEPING SOLUTIONS TO AMICUS OVERLOAD 
In a world of unlimited time and attention, the Supreme Court Justices, 
their law clerks, and other interested observers could carefully read every 
amicus brief. But in a world of limited resources, reading scores of briefs, 
many of them duplicative, is probably neither practicable nor desirable. The 
most obvious solution to the overload problem is to rely on some 
gatekeeper—such as the Supreme Court itself, the parties, or the expert 
Supreme Court bar—to control the filing of briefs and to keep out 
duplicative, low-quality briefs. Such restriction-oriented approaches have 
some merit, but they also have significant drawbacks, as we briefly explain. 
 
A. THE SUPREME COURT AS GATEKEEPER 
 
The Supreme Court’s rules require most entities that wish to file an 
amicus brief to obtain permission from either the Court or both parties.6 It 
is unusual today for parties to withhold their consent, and indeed the parties 
often submit blanket consents to any and all potential amicus filings.7 As a 
result, amicus participation is essentially open access. One obvious solution 
is eliminating the option of party consent and instead requiring potential 
amici to file a motion explaining to the Court why the brief provides 
valuable information or is otherwise worthy of the Court’s attention. 
This proposal has obvious drawbacks, which might explain why the 
Court has not adopted it. For one, the Court would be burdened with the 
duty to decide each motion for permission to file, which is probably not a 
                                                 
6. SUP. CT. R. 37.3.  
7. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 749–51 (10th ed. 2013); 
Franze & Anderson, supra note 1.  
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good use of its time,8 and the parties might feel compelled to file their own 
responses opposing certain motions. Further, there is some expressive, 
democratic value in having a Supreme Court that freely permits amicus 
filings.9 The Court makes national policy, so it is good for it to give affected 
persons (i.e., all of us) a say in its decisions. 
 
B. GREATER PARTY CONTROL 
 
Another approach would be to give the parties greater control over 
amicus filings. As envisioned by Michael Solimine in a recent essay, such 
a system would allow each side in a case to parcel out a limited number of 
amicus slots (say, five or ten) to amici of its choice.10 One virtue of this 
proposal is that it acknowledges that supposedly disinterested “friends of 
the court” are often just friends of a party. At the same time, that is also a 
weakness of this proposal: it gives the parties too much control over which 
groups can officially present their views to the Court. A Supreme Court 
decision not only resolves a particular dispute but also, and probably more 
importantly, establishes national law. The public interest may be served by 
a resolution that neither party favors (like deciding the case on statutory 
rather than constitutional grounds or dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). 
What’s more, the parties’ attorneys might not even want this formal 
gatekeeping power and the headaches that come with it.11 To be sure, the 
party-control model could have a safety-value through which a potential 
filer could seek the Court’s permission after being rebuffed by the parties. 
But, as we have said, the Court probably does not want, and arguably should 
not have, this gatekeeping function. 
 
C. EXPERT COORDINATION 
 
The proposals above rely on some formal barrier to filing, but another 
approach relies on informal coordination of amicus filings. A recent article 
by Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins tells the story of how the small, 
highly sophisticated club of Supreme Court specialists facilitates the 
                                                 
8. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
9. See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 315, 346–47 (2008). There are other ways of limiting amicus briefs that are also 
unappealing from the point of view of public participation, like imposing a sizable filing 
fee to encourage potential amici to appreciate some of the costs of their actions. 
10. Michael E. Solimine, Retooling the Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
151, 165 (2016). 
11. See Larsen & Devins, supra note 3, at 1913 n.69 (noting that the Supreme Court 
litigators they interviewed overwhelmingly opposed limitations on briefs and did not want 
to serve as gatekeepers). 
138 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE            [VOL. 106
  
 
coordination of effective amicus teams.12 A party represented by one of 
these specialists—as parties with business before the Court increasingly 
often are13—lines up a team of amici (also represented by members of this 
club) and assigns each of them a topic or angle on the case. The attorney 
coordinating the amicus effort also tries to prevent or at least refocus some 
amicus filings that would be duplicative or unhelpful.14 This coordination 
among repeat-player experts should lead to the filing of a collection of high-
quality, non-repetitive amicus briefs. 
Informal gatekeeping and coordination among members of the Supreme 
Court bar does provide several benefits, but it is not a complete solution to 
the problem of information overload. We already have a pretty well-oiled 
“amicus machine,” but we also still have cases with a hundred amicus 
briefs. Supreme Court experts are not a cartel that can prevent organizations 
and attorneys from filing briefs, and ethical rules limit the parties’ ability to 
control amicus arguments. Nor can the experts themselves easily turn away 
a client (especially a client that generates lots of fees in other cases) who 
wants to file an amicus brief that does not fit with the approved strategy or 
who wishes to file a “me too” brief that merely serves to signal the client’s 
position to its constituencies.15 
II.  AN INFORMATIONAL ALTERNATIVE:  
SCORING AMICUS BRIEFS ACCORDING TO THEIR DISTINCTIVE CONTENT 
What the proposals above, and many other potential solutions, have in 
common is the use of some gatekeeper to directly or indirectly limit amicus 
filings. An alternative to limiting filings is to help readers prioritize them so 
as to allocate scarce resources to the most valuable briefs. The prioritization 
approach requires some method—other than reading all of the briefs—to 
quickly assess a brief’s likely contributions. This is already done today 
through the use of proxies such as the identity of the amicus or its attorney.16 
We propose instead to rate a brief’s value according to its substance as 
measured through automated content analysis. More specifically, we 
suggest using software to identify the amicus briefs with the greatest 
proportion of non-duplicative material. The resulting rankings can then be 
made available online for any interested person—inside or outside the 
                                                 
12. Id. at 1903–04, 1915–26.  
13. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491–1502 (2008). 
14. Larsen & Devins, supra note 3, at 1925. 
15. See Bell & Violante, supra note 1 (“In some cases, there’s little even a highly 
experienced attorney can do to limit the number of amicus briefs. Anyone can file one . . . 
creating a tidal wave of briefs that is nearly impossible to stop.”). 
16. See Lynch, supra note 4, at 46–47, 54–56. 
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Supreme Court—to consider. This information-based approach to the 
overload problem preserves openness while providing another way to 
separate the wheat from the growing pile of chaff. We do not imagine that 
busy law clerks will stop using other heuristics and proxies, such as the 
assumption that a prominent Supreme Court litigator is likely to file a 
worthwhile amicus brief. But our distinctiveness scores can supplement 
those reputational proxies with information that is systematic and 
evenhanded. 
The basic method for identifying distinctive briefs is simple enough. We 
compare an amicus brief against a corpus composed of all other amicus 
briefs filed in the same case. Our comparison tool is the plagiarism-
detection program WCopyfind, which is freely available and fairly easy to 
use.17 The software generates a percentage reflecting how much of a subject 
text overlaps with a comparison text. Plagiarism-detection software, and the 
WCopyfind program in particular, has been used before in empirical legal 
studies, most often to detect overlap between Supreme Court opinions and 
sources like briefs and lower-court opinions.18 Our focus here is not the 
sources of the language in the Court’s opinions (though that is an important 
topic too) but rather studying amicus briefs themselves and ranking them 
according to one important dimension of their value. 
We do not believe that briefs share language primarily because one brief 
actually copies from another, nor that actual copying would always be 
improper in this context. That is, we are not dealing with “plagiarism” in 
the academic-misconduct sense. The most common explanation for overlap 
is that briefs are repeating the same key passages from leading precedents, 
dredging up the same bits of legislative debate, using the stock arguments 
that have developed while a circuit split percolated, and the like. There is 
nothing unusual about that kind of unoriginality, but a brief that is 
unoriginal in that way is, other things being equal, less likely to contribute 
information not already before the court.  
We should note a few limitations of our approach. Although plagiarism-
detection software is recognized as a reliable enough tool for finding 
similarities between legal documents, the software cannot perfectly 
measure the kind of original content we care about the most. The software 
                                                 
17 . See THE PLAGIARISM RESOURCE SITE: WCOPYFIND, https://perma.cc/M8ES-
XQXH. 
18. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 98 (2012); Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 917, 919, 928 (2015); 
Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court 
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE 228, 230–32 (2014); Pamela C. Corley, The 
Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 
468, 471–77 (2008); Adam Feldman, All Copying Is Not Created Equal: Borrowed 
Language in Supreme Court Opinions, 17 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 21 (2016). 
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captures similarity of language, which is not the same as detecting 
duplicative ideas and arguments. Subtle changes in wording can generate 
very different meanings, and wholly different words can express virtually 
the same meaning.19  
A further limitation is that non-duplication is an imperfect proxy for a 
brief’s value. A measure of non-duplication will incorrectly highlight some 
low-value briefs and fail to identify some high-value briefs. As an 
illustration of the first problem, consider that an amicus brief consisting of 
Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” would score as extremely distinctive when 
compared to other briefs in a case. The problem with a brief full of nonsense 
is that it is too original, in the wrong kind of way. Norms of professional 
conduct, fortunately, usually suffice to prevent the filing of briefs that are 
highly distinctive by virtue of being wholly divorced from the arguably 
relevant law and facts. And even when they are filed, the reader can 
recognize them easily, often from the table of contents or odd formatting 
alone. In practice, we expect manual intervention on the part of the clerks 
by separating out such briefs through a combination of reviewing the 
proxies on the briefs and taking a quick glance at the distinctive, although 
non-useful, substantive material within the briefs. 
More significantly, some briefs are valuable even if they are not 
distinctive. One way in which a Supreme Court expert can excel is by 
fashioning the same legal materials that have been rehearsed in a dozen 
prior circuit decisions—the conflicting Supreme Court precedents, the key 
sections of a statute—into an argument that hits the Justices just right. An 
amicus brief written by one of the bar’s famous names may be worth reading 
even if it is not very distinctive by our measure. Similarly, a brief filed by 
the Solicitor General will always command attention. The office’s 
reputation for evenhandedness and rigor makes its pronouncements 
particularly trustworthy; and to the extent that the Solicitor General’s brief 
sets forth the government’s official position on matters of statutory and 
regulatory law, that position may even possess legally operative force.20 
Further, sometimes a brief’s value does not depend on its content at all 
but rather derives simply from the fact that a specific entity took a particular 
position. The filing of a brief can function as a signal of interest-group 
                                                 
19. Note that a tool’s success in detecting the right kind of duplication depends on the 
state of technology. WCopyfind has the virtues of being simple and accessible, but there 
are more sophisticated techniques for measuring a text’s contribution to informational 
efficiency; in the future, we can expect methods that are even better. 
20. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (deferring to an agency 
interpretation that was presented to the Court in an amicus brief); cf. BLACK & OWENS, 
supra note 18, at 97–112 (finding that the Solicitor General’s merits briefs do not need to 
be clearly written to be influential). 
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alignments or elite opinions.21 If the Chamber of Commerce, forty state 
attorneys general, and the American Bar Association all support an 
outcome, the mere fact of their support, especially their common support, is 
relevant information even if the content of their briefs is duplicative. Of 
course, if a brief’s value comes from its mere existence, one does not have 
to read beyond its front cover to perceive that dimension of value. A 
measurement of the brief’s distinctive content, which our method provides, 
would still help one decide which briefs to read for what they say.22 
In short, distinctive content is one important aspect of a brief’s value 
and plagiarism-detection software is one relatively tractable way to measure 
distinctive content. That is enough to make our method valuable to the busy 
clerk, reporter, or researcher who wants to identify the most valuable amicus 
briefs in a case featuring scores of them. 
III.  RESULTS FROM RECENT HIGH-PROFILE CASES 
Using the strategy described above, we constructed a dataset of all 
amicus briefs from nine high-profile cases, more specifically the three cases 
with the most amicus filings from the 2014, 2015, and 2016 Supreme Court 
terms. These cases were: 
 
Obergefell v. Hodges,23 Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,24 and King v. Burwell25 from 
2014;  
 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,26 Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin,27 and Zubik v. Burwell28 from 2015; and  
 
                                                 
21 . See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping out the Strategic Terrain: The 
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215, 225–28 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman 
eds., The University of Chicago Press 1997); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 782–
87 (2000). 
22. One more methodological note: We are concerned with briefs filed at the merits 
stage, not the certiorari stage, and so our comparison corpus includes only merits-stage 
briefs. At the certiorari stage, the overload problem is less acute (though it is growing). 
Plus, the signaling value of an amicus brief (i.e., the demonstration that interest groups care 
about the issue) is especially important at that stage, with content being relatively less 
important than it is at the merits stage. 
23. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
24. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
25. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
26. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
27. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
28. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
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Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer,29 Impression Products v. Lexmark 
International,30 and the remanded case of Gloucester County School 
Board v. G.G.31 from 2016.   
 
The total sample size from these cases is 574 amicus briefs. 
We measured the amount of language each amicus brief in these cases 
shares with the corpus composed of all other amicus briefs from the same 
case.32 To provide an overview of these data, we created histograms for 
each case showing the fraction of briefs on the vertical axis and the 
percentage of overlapping language that this fraction of briefs share with 
their respective corpora on the horizontal axis. 
 
Figure 1. Histogram of Briefs’ Overlap by Case  
(Number of Briefs in Each Case in Parentheses) 
 
 
                                                 
29. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
30. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
31. 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
32. The WCopyfind software has various sensitivity settings that make it more or less 
likely to detect common language across two texts; here, we use the settings that previous 
researchers have generally used. Most importantly, we set the program to locate phrases 
minimally six words in length that were at least 80% identical. All of the briefs were 
obtained from Lexis in a plain-text format that omits the table of authorities, so that section 
does not play a role in the comparisons. Including the table of authorities would probably 
increase all of the overlap percentages slightly. 
2017] THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 143
  
These histograms depict the similarities and differences in the 
dispersion of overlap between briefs in the different cases.  Although there 
are differences between cases, there is also a strong similarity between 
them, as most of the briefs in each case fit into the 5%-40% overlap region.  
To obtain a better sense of the differences between overlap values within 
each case, Figure 2 presents the mean overlap values along with 95% 
confidence intervals for each case.  In these graphs the means are the red 
diamonds while the lines extending above and below the diamonds give the 
95% confidence-interval ranges. 
 
Figure 2. Mean Overlap Values with 95% Confidence Intervals by Case 
 
Figure 2 enhances our understanding of the distinctions between the 
briefs in the various cases. The means in the first two cases plotted, Fisher 
and Gloucester, are the farthest apart of any two cases in the dataset. This 
Figure also confirms a conclusion that could be deduced from Figure 1—
that the mean overlap values of most of the briefs in these cases hovers 
around the 20% level. This 20% level coincides with the top of most of the 
bells in the histograms in Figure 1. 
With these ranges in mind, the overlap values of the briefs in each case 
have greater meaning. The following table reports the five (or more, in case 
of ties) most and least distinctive briefs from each of the nine cases along 
with the percentage of each brief that overlaps with its respective corpus.33 
                                                 
33. Attorney David Boyle filed amicus briefs on his own behalf in six of the nine cases 
(more than any other amicus filer in this set of cases), and his briefs are among the most 
distinctive briefs in four of the cases. We removed these briefs from the results after 
reviewing them. Most of the briefs are unconventional in style and sources. As stated 
earlier, unique content is neither necessary nor sufficient in determining a brief’s value to 
the Court. His briefs are likely known at the Court, so we feel comfortable excluding them 
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The absolute percentages of overlap are, of course, sensitive to changes in 
the software’s settings, but the relative rankings provide meaningful 
measures of variations in briefs’ distinctive content. 
 
Table 1. Most and Least Distinctive Amicus Briefs in Each Case 




                                                 
from the tables here, which are meant to provide information not otherwise readily 
available to a reader. Also dropped from the results was a brief for which the Court denied 
a motion for leave to file. 
Most Distinctive Briefs Least Distinctive Briefs 
Overlap % Filing Organization Filing Organization Overlap % 
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. 
5% Public Safety Experts (P) Human Rights Watch (R) 28% 
7% Dean Ronald A. Cass et al. (P) Foundation for Moral Law (P)  28% 
7% Dr. Ben Barres et al. (R) Anti-Defamation League (R) 26% 
8% Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty (P) Concerned Women for America (P) 26% 
9% American Bar Ass’n (R) American Academy of Pediatrics (R) 25% 
9% NAACP Legal Defense Fund (R) Scholars Who Study the Transgender 
Population (R) 
25% 
9% William J. Bennett (P)   
Impression Products v. Lexmark International 
5% Medtronic PLC and Zimmer Biomet 
Holdings (R) 
Huawei Technologies (P) 34% 
11% Imaging Supplies Coalition (R) Medical Device Manufacturers Association 
(R) 
34% 
12% Plantronics, Inc. (R) Mitchell Hamline School of Law IP 
Institute (P) 
31% 
13% Boston Patent Law Association (R) HTC Corp. (P) 28% 
13% Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (R) 
United States (P) 28% 
13% Interdigital, Inc. (R)   
13% Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A. and 
Canada), Inc. (N) 
  
13% Law Professors Adam Mossoff and 
Gregory Dolin (R) 
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Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer 
10% Lambda Legal (R) Members of Congress (P) 24% 
13% American Civil Liberties Union (R) World Vision (P) 24% 
14% Belmont Abbey College (P) Colorado (P) 23% 
14% Nat’l Education Ass’n (R) Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty (P) 22% 
15% The Bronx Household of Faith (P) U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (P) 22% 
15% Institute for Justice (P)   
15% Justice and Freedom Fund (P)   
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
6% Professor W. Burlette Carter (R) American Psychological Ass’n (R) 42% 
8% American Center for Law and Justice (P) Richard Kahlenberg (N) 41% 
9% Jonathan Zell (P) California (R) 39% 
11% Current and Former Student Body 
Presidents of University of Texas (R) 
Family of Heman Sweatt (R) 39% 
12% Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. (R) Coalition of Bar Ass’ns of Color (R) 38% 
12% Richard Sander (N)   
12% Experimental Psychologists (R)   
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
8% Illinois Right to Life (R) 163 Members of Congress (P) 40% 
9% Right to Life Advocates, Inc. (R) Social Science Researchers (P) 37% 
12% Theologians and Ethicists (P) American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (P) 
36% 
12% Physicians for Reproductive Health (P) 450 Bicameral and Bipartisan State 
Legislators (R) 
34% 
12% Hon. Wendy Davis (P) Former Abortion Providers (R) 34% 
12% National Center for Lesbian Rights (P) Judson Memorial Church (P) 34% 
  Yale Information Society Project (P) 34% 
Zubik v. Burwell 
8% Military Historians (R) Black Women’s Health Imperative (R) 35% 
9% Baptist Joint Committee for Religious 
Liberty (R) 
Guttmacher Institute (R) 34% 
9% 50 Catholic Theologians and Ethicists 
(P) 
Texas et al. (P) 32% 
11% Compassion & Choices (R) Liberty Counsel (P) 32% 
11% National Jewish Commission on Law & 
Public Affairs (COLPA) (P) 
Ass’n of American Physicians & Surgeons 
(P) 
3% 
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Obergefell v. Hodges 
6% Heather Barwick and Katy Faust (R) American Family Ass’n—Michigan (R) 55% 
6% Jon Simmons (R) CatholicVote.org Education Fund (R) 45% 
8% PFLAG (P) Michigan Catholic Conference (R) 44% 
8% Mattachine Society (P) 167 Members of the House of Representatives 
(P) 
43% 
8% Professor W. Burlette Carter (N) Virginia (P) 42% 
8% American College of Pediatricians (R) Family Equality Council (P) 42% 
Texas Department Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project 
5% Students from the New York University 
School of Law (R)  
Housing Equality Center of Pennsylvania (R) 35% 
5% Housing Scholars (R) National Community Land Trust (R) 34% 
12% National Fair Housing Alliance (R) Howard University School of Law Housing 
Clinic (R) 
31% 
12% Cities of San Francisco et al. (R) Texas Apartment Ass’n (P) 31% 
12% Sociologists, Social Psychologists, and 
Legal Scholars (R) 
American Civil Rights Union (P) 27% 
 
 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law (R) 
27% 
King v. Burwell 
7% Joseph R. Evanns (P) Asian & Pacific Islander American Health 
Forum (R) 
40% 
9% Landmark Legal Foundation (P) Virginia et al. (R) 38% 
11% Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action 
(JALSA) (R) 
National Women’s Law Center (R) 34% 
13% Consumers’ Research (P) American Center for Law & Justice (P) 31% 
14% Missouri Liberty Project (P) American Thoracic Society (R) 30% 
14% Pacific Research Institute (P)   
 
This method for locating the most and least distinctive amicus briefs in 
each case gives us a sense of the types of amicus briefs that fall into each 
category. Although this sample only covers a small number of cases, many 
familiar amici who file multiple briefs every year do not file the most 
distinctive briefs. Notably, the United States, which is probably the most 
important amicus filer of all, filed five amicus briefs with a mean overlap 
of 26%, a rate that indicates less distinctive contributions than the average 
filer. That is not particularly surprising given that the Solicitor General’s 
briefs tend to be conventional and doctrinal; as stated above, their value 
does not derive from being highly original but instead from being 
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authoritative. By contrast, the most uniquely informative briefs in these 
cases are often from scholars and lesser known groups. This suggests the 
possibility that such filers have more distinctive interests than large groups 
with broad memberships and conventional policy goals. 
High-profile cases often attract amicus briefs of quite different kinds—
conventional doctrinal briefs, of course, but also briefs that present legal 
history, social-scientific research, policy consequences, and more. 
Therefore, for some of the biggest cases one does not want to identify just 
the most valuable briefs in general but the most valuable briefs addressing 
a particular topic or presenting a certain kind of information. To illustrate a 
refinement on the basic approach above, we ran all of the amicus briefs from 
Obergefell, the case with the most amicus briefs of the nine cases in our 
dataset, through topic-modeling software to create topic clusters.34 This 
software locates salient language in each brief and groups the briefs in 
categories or sets of topics that arise from a set of briefs. The user must 
specify the number of topic groups and number of topics within each group, 
as well as select a title for each topic. We created seven topic clusters from 
the briefs in Obergefell. We then created a separate corpus for each topic 
cluster to seek out the briefs with the most unique information within each 
cluster. The composition of the clusters can be found in Table 2. 
 
          Table 2. Obergefell Amicus Brief Topics 
 
Clusters Topics in cluster 
Studies sexual, sex, orientation, health, research, gay, men, study, studies, women
Federal Law law, court, amendment, rights, laws, fourteenth, protection, loving, equal, 
clause 
Religion religious, marriage, sex, civil, government, rights, liberty, church, 
religion, equality
State Law sex, state, couples, marriage, laws, states, court, law, discrimination, 
marriages 
State Politics marriage, court, states, state, petitioners, people, man, woman, political, 
law 




gay, couples, married, LGBT, lesbian, benefits, people, sex, health, 
equality 
 
Table 3 shows the seven most distinctive briefs within each cluster.  It 
should be no surprise that the percentages of overlapping language are lower 
here since the comparison corpora for this part of the analysis consist of 
only the briefs in the same cluster. 
                                                 
34. More specifically, we used MALLETT, https://perma.cc/QG2B-BA8Z. 
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Some amici fit within the cluster one would expect. The briefs filed by 
the American Psychological Association and the American Public Health 
Association both rely significantly on scientific research, and so, 
unsurprisingly, they land in the Studies cluster. But in other instances, the 
cluster assignment provides information about content that is not obvious 
from the nature of the filing entity. For example, the brief filed by the AFL-
CIO and other labor organizations falls into the Sexual Orientation cluster 
because the brief focuses on the practical difficulties faced by the LGBT 
community in accessing employer health coverage, Social Security benefits, 
and other benefits that were traditionally limited to opposite-sex spouses. 
These results convey the utility of topic modeling’s reliance on the language 
within each brief, rather than the filing party’s identify, to organize the 
clusters.  
 
Table 3. Most Distinctive Amicus Briefs in Obergefell Topic Clusters 
 
Percent 
Overlap Brief Cluster 
1% Heather Barwick and Katy Faust Family
3% 100 Scholars of Marriage Family
4% Leaders of the 2012 Republican National Convention Committee Family
5% The Donaldson Adoption Institute Family
6% Organizations and Scholars of Gender-Diverse Parenting Family
7% Scholars of the Welfare of Women, Children, and Underprivileged 
Populations Family
10% Organizations that Promote Biological Parenting Family
2% Professor W. Burlette Carter Federal Law
4% Mike Huckabee Policy Solutions Federal Law
5% South Carolina Federal Law
7% NAACP Legal Defense Fund Federal Law
7% Virginia Federal Law
8% Cato Institute Federal Law
10% Constitutional Accountability Center Federal Law
4% American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Religion
4% Religious Organizations, Public Speakers Religion
6% 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries Religion
6% California Council of Churches Religion
9% The General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists Religion
9% President of the House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church Religion
9% Douglas Laycock Religion
4% Elected Officials and Former Officeholders of Michigan Sexual 
Orientation
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6% ProtectMarriage.com – Yes on 8 Sexual 
Orientation
7% Same-Sex Attracted Men and their Wives Sexual 
Orientation
9% Marriage Equality USA Sexual 
Orientation
10% 379 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers Sexual 
Orientation
11% American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Sexual 
Orientation
11% Services and Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Elders Sexual 
Orientation
6% The Committee for Justice State Politics
8% Frank Schubert State Politics
9% Lighted Candle Society State Politics
10% CatholicVote.org Education Fund State Politics
10% Scholars of History and Related Disciplines State Politics
11% 57 Members of U.S. Congress State Politics
11% Louisiana State Politics
8% Conflict of Law Scholars State Law
8% LGBT Student Organizations at Undergraduate, Graduate, and Professional 
Schools State Law
9% Family Law Scholars State Law
9% Freedom to Marry State Law
9% National Women's Law Center State Law
9% United States State Law
13% 167 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 44 U.S. Senators State Law
2% The Mattachine Society of Washington D.C. Studies
4% Judith Reisman Studies
5% GLMA Studies
6% Prof. Daniel Robinson Studies
6% Dr. Paul McHugh Studies
8% American Psychological Association Studies
8% American Public Health Association Studies
CONCLUSION 
Plagiarism-detection software can be used to identify the amicus briefs 
with the most and least distinctive language. Distinctiveness so measured is 
not the only measure of an amicus brief’s value, of course, but it is one 
important aspect of value along with other factors, including non-content-
related attributes such as the institutional prestige or political power of the 
filing entity.   
Our results provide suggestive findings regarding what kinds of briefs 
tend to be most distinctive, but further investigation could yield additional 
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insights into what kinds of filing entities and attorneys are most likely to 
file distinctive amicus briefs. In addition, one could test which kinds of 
cases are most likely to attract distinctive briefs. One could hypothesize that 
cases with multiple questions presented and cases that involve “new” legal 
controversies rather than well-rehearsed ones are likely to generate more 
varied filings. A hint of such a finding might be suggested by the way 
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. stands out in Figure 2; the case 
involves the relatively new legal issue of transgender rights, and the Court’s 
grant of certiorari encompassed two disparate issues.35 
The distinctiveness measures illustrated here have a variety of practical 
applications for the legal community. For one, they can be used on an 
ongoing basis to provide a “reader’s guide” for law clerks, law students, the 
press, and anyone else who wants help in selecting which of the fifty or 
more amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court’s biggest cases are most 
worth reading. If distinctiveness scores become widely known at the Court 
and among Court watchers, there is at least the possibility that reputation-
conscious attorneys writing amicus briefs would, over time, change how 
they write briefs or work harder to coordinate with other amici to reduce 
unnecessary filings.  
This project uses software to measure the unique content of amicus 
briefs, but automated techniques have also been used to measure other 
content-based features of legal filings, such as a document’s clarity of 
expression. 36  One could combine multiple techniques into a composite 
score that aims to capture a broader measure of value. To be sure, there is 
no substitute for actually reading a brief and bringing one’s sensitive 
professional judgment to bear. But in the absence of sufficient time to bring 
that judgment fully to bear on every document, automated analysis is a 
helpful sorting tool, and it will probably become more helpful as technology 
improves. 
 
                                                 
35. 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (granting certiorari on a question of administrative law and 
the substantive question of transgender rights). 
36. See, e.g., Brady Coleman & Quy Phung, The Language of Supreme Court Briefs: 
A Large-Scale Quantitative Investigation, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 83–85 (2010); 
Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Does the Readability of Your Brief Affect Your 
Chance of Winning an Appeal? An Analysis of Readability in Appellate Briefs and its 
Correlation with Success on Appeal, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 145 (2011); Shaun B. 
Spencer & Adam Feldman, The Empirical Relationship Between Brief Quality and 
Summary Judgment Success, 22 LEGAL WRITING (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15–
17). 
